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I. REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS I. A. 
AND E. 
A. Defendants arc Precl11ded from Advancing Two 
Totally Contradictory Po8itions on Appeal. 
DPfendants answerPd plaintiff's Amended Complaint 
as follows: 
By the instrument ref erred to as Exhibit A 
[Agreement of July 25] in the complaint and 
certain oral understandings between defendants 
and plaintiff, the defendants granted the plaintiff 
1 
an option for a period of six months ... In cou. 
sideration of said option the plaintiff paid defend 
ants the total sum of $20,000.00. 
At the start of the trial defendants abandoned their 
pleadings and took the opposite position that there wai 
no option contract. (See Plaintiff's Brief, p. 42). At 
the close of trial defendants proposed Findings and Con. 
clnsions reciting that there was no contract; these Find-
ings and Conclusions were entered by the court. 
-
Upon rehearing on November 18, 1966, the trial conrt 
informed defendants that the Findings and Conclusions 
they had submitted and which had been entered by the 
court were contrary to the judgment of the court. At this 
hearing the trial court demanded that defendant take onr 
position or the other (See Tr-2, pp. 21-23). Whereupon 
the following discourse took place : 
THE COURT: Now this has been going on 
a long time. Yon better both be prepared, .von 
and all of your counsel, and it is true of the otlt~r 
side. 
I want to know whether or not your position 
now is that there was such an agreement, that i' 
by their conduct, that then~ was such an agreement 
and that th(~y failed to act within that time. 
MR. JENSEN: I think that this-
'l'HE COURT: Because this case has ber·n 
decided upon that theory. (Tr.-2, pp. 37, 38) 
* * • 
THE COURT: 'Vell, I suggest that you argue 
here in support of the position taken by your own 
client, to the effect that there was an option agree-
2 
lllf'nt and that it PXpin•d on .January 15th, and lH· 
was entitled to his $20,000.00. (Tr-2, p. 41) 
• • • 
THJ<J COUR'r: T think it is ratlwr }>Pculiar 
f'or ,'\OU 1wople to come in and argtw tlwrP was no 
option wlwn your client mys then• was an option 
and testified accordingly. (Tr-2, p. 41) 
• • • 
'l'HE COl'RT: If I can't rely upon the testi-
mony of :rnur client. 
MR. .JENSEN: TherP is not an)· question 
about it. 
THE COURT: Tlwn there ought to be a 
rPview of my decision. 
MR. .JENSEN: There is no question about 
it, )·ou can rely on him, that is his position, that 
is the position of both parties that there was an 
option . ... (Tr-2, p. 42) (Emphasis supplied) 
• • • 
Subsequent to this !waring defendants adopted the 
position that there was a valid binding contract and sub-
mitted the revised Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law whieh are the subject of this appeal. These Findings 
n•cite that there was a valid and binding option agree-
ment between the parties snf ficient to sustain the $20,-
000 consideration paid by plaintiff to the defendants. 
Now, on appeal, defendants not only argue in support 
of their position as found by tlw trial court but argue 
th<> opposite position which they were forced by the court 
to abandon as U'Pll. These inconsistent and diametrically 
oppos<>d positions can be summarized as follows: 
(1) That the July 25 letter alone is critically 
dPficient; and 
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(2) That the July 25 letter, supplemented by the 
three oral agreements found by the trial court 
suddPnly beconws a fnlly Pnforeeahle contra('('. 
The defendants contend, on page 9 of their brief, 
that at least "three critical and essential matters" arp 
not covered by the July 25 agreement. The difficulty with 
this argument is that the matters said to be critically 
omitted from the July 25 writing are nowhere suppli~d 
by any alleged oral understandings. 
Such oral understandings, as found hy the trial comt, 
related only to: (1) the commencement date of the 
TOSCO-Larson employment contract; (2) an agrPenwnt 
to negotiate further details; and (3) the cornrnencPmrnt 
date of the option. As pointed out in plaintiff's brif·f, 
the first term is not relevant to the controversy, and 
the other two terms are expressly covered by the .Jnly 
25 writing. 
The defendants argue on the one hand that the Jnly 
25 agreement is not complete with respect to their duty 
to perform thereunder, and on the other hand that such 
agreement is complete with respect to their right to n·-
tain the $20,000.00 paid by TOSCO. This they cannot do. 
See, e.g. Osborn v. Kington, 148 Kan. 314, 80 P.2d 1063 
(1938). 
Since defendants rely on the ver.'T written contract 
plaintiff seeks to have enforced, the only question for 
decision is whether that written contract governs tlw 
commencement date of the six-months option period. 
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B. A Preliminary Agreement, When Acted V pon 
l!y the Parties, Co11stit11t<'s a Binding Contract. 
DPfrndants argue that if the July 25 agreement is 
111 .. n·I:· a pn~liminary agreement, tlw parties are not 
honnd tlwrP!Jy. \Ylwn parties mutually agree on the 
tenns of a contract, they may be bound by such prelimi-
nar.' agrP<>lllPnt PYen if formal documents setting forth 
th(• tPrms in detail are not subsequently signed. SeP 
Smith r. Onyx Oil & Chemical Co., 218 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir. 
1955) ; 1 Williston, Contracts, §§28, 28A. This is true even 
if t!JP original agreement is not reduced to writing. See, 
e.g., Comerata v. Chaumont Co., 52 N.J. Super. 299, 
145 A.2d 471 (1958); American Aero Corp. v. Grwnd 
C'eiltrrtl Aircraft Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 69, 317 P.2d 694. 
'rl1Ps(• anthorities hold that the subsequent conduct of the 
parties may be such as to bind the parties to the terms 
agreed upon in the preliminary agreement. See Corbin, 
Contracts, §101. Here, the parties reached a preliminary 
agreP11wnt on .Tnly 25, 19G3, and their subsequent con-
duct and the• formal agrPernents (Appendix B of Appel-
lants Brief) affirmed the agreements reduced to writing 
at that timP. 
fn the case of D.A.C. Uranium Co. v. Benton, (D. 
Colo. 1156) 149 F. Supp. 667, the parties entered into a 
pn•liminar.'" agreement for the lease of mining claims. 
When tlw LPssor refnsPd to sign the formal lease agree-
n11·nts later pn•pared, the LesseP brought suit. Thus the 
fads arP practical!.'· identical to the case at hand. The 
<·mirt SJH•cifically enforced the following agreement: 
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Victor C. Herlacher (leasec) and Richard Brady 
and Robert Benton (Ieasors). 
l. Leasors to retain :'>'?~ rnyalty on nd 111ill 
rdurns and 5% of all bonus Pxeept frpight h0111 1,, 
2. Leason; to n·tain tlw dP\'(')opuwnt bonus. 
3. If Ow pereentage of ore increases in rnlui· 
1/3 ahove original shiprnPnt, IPasors are to rPtain 
10% after the first year. 
4. Leasf' to contimw indPfinitPly as long- as 
it eontinnes six months of each year. 
5. This agreement eoneerns all mining elai1u' 
situated in Section No. 11, Township No. 47, Ha11.~" 
No. 11, FrPmont Connt~-. This [tlll'sP J claims a1·1· 
known as the lightning gronp." 
In comparison with tlw above s1wcifically enforceahlf~ 
agreement, the July 25 AgrPement would appear to ht> a 
"formal contract" in and of itself. 
C. Plaintiff Seeks Sp('cific Performanct' of the J11l,11 
25 Agreement. 
In Argument I.E. of their brief, defendants contend 
that plaintiff seeks to have the court create a contract 
between the parties which does not conform to the July 
25 agreement. 
Plaintiff vigorously rejects the proposition that it 
seeks specific performance of any contract other than 
the July 25 agreement. Defendants do not deny the 
terms that are embodied in the appendices to plaintiff's 
brief. They could hardly do so, inasmuch as they signe<l 
the July 25 agreement and prepared the drafts embodied 
6 
---
in the appendices. Rather, defendants confuse the issue 
by ref erring to draft documents prepared in February 
of 1964. These later drafts were obviously designed 
for <lis<'11ssion purposes only, not for execution. Portions 
, 1·:·n· p11rposPfull~, underlined as departures from earlier 
(lrafts. N"o "refusal to sign" the February drafts led to 
tliis lawsuit. Rather, Larson's disavowal of his obligation 
to sign an~· formal documenh; under the .July 25 agree-
11wnt forced plaintiff to seek judicial enforcement of such 
agTee111Pnt. Defendants' detailed criticisms of the Febru-
an· drafts are not relevant. 
Tlw cases relif'd on b~v dPfendants for their statement 
that the court ''has consistently refused to supply mis-
si11g elements of a contract" are also not in point. Price 
r. Uoyd, 31 Utah SG, SG Pac. 767 (1906) and Hargreaves 
r. H11rto11, 59 Utah 575, 20G Pac. 262 (1922) deal with the 
doctrine· of part performance and the statute of frauds 
in rf'lation to alleg(•d parol gifts of realty. Pitcher v. 
J,uurit:rn, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967) was df'-
eid0d on the basis of mutual abandonment of an original 
oral contract. Defendants cannot, of course, rely on plain-
tiff's performance, and the attempt to establish an oral 
contract differing from the provisions of the July 25 
agreeuwnt Yiolates the statute of frauds as well as the 
parol eYidence rule. 
The court is not ask1c•d to make a new contract be-
twPPn thf' partit>s. As stafrd in thf' July 25 agreement, 
tlw purpose of that lf'tter was to 
statP tlw intention of TOSCO and the shareholders 
of Larson Oil Co., as modified on July 24, to here-
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aftPr Pnter into contracts and agn'PlllPnts gi\'iug 
exprPssion to thosP undt>rstandings as th<•.\ pertain 
to the holdings of Larson Oil Co. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
'l'he contracts and agrPPmPnh; r(:'ferred to abow 
did come into existenc(:' on December 13, 1963. D<drnd-
ants' only witnPss, Fred V. Larson, stated in regard to 
these contracts: 
Q. (By Mr. Dufford) Mr. Larson, in n·-
sponse to questions asked by }Jlaintiff's connsPl 
yon stated that the documents identified as plain-
tiff's l!Jxhibits No. 4 arnl 5, lAppPndix B of plain-
tiff's briPf], I beliPve ~-on statt>d wel'l' complr-fe 
in all respects at the time they were transmith·d 
to tlw plaintiff? 
A. That is correct, that is what I stated. 
(Tr-1, p. 50) (Emphasis supplied) 
Tht> only provisions contained in plaintiff's appt>n-
dices which differ from Dufford's draft of DecPmlwr 13, 
are, as admitted by dPfendants' counsel, supplied by the 
.July 25 agrePment. (See Plaintiff's Brief, page 18; Tr-3, 
p.p. 46, 47) 
Defendants either prepared or agreed to every word 
in the documents attached as plaintiff's appendices. The 
court is not asked to supply a single word, but merely to 
order the enforcement of the written contract behn•en 
the parties which is in existence and before the court. In 
the case of Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 P.2d 893 
( 1946), this court specifically Pnforced a similar pre-
liminary agreement under similar circumstances. 
As this court stated in Cummings v. Nielson, 32 Utah 
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1m. 120 Pac. Gl9 (1912), ·'equity regards that as certain 
irhich ma~· be made certain." All details were supplied, 
as int<-rnkd by the parties, in the revisions of the Tweedy 
rlraft pn·1iarPd by Larson and Dufford in DPcember, 
1 !J(;:i. 'rlH•se documents clParl~· evidenc<• tht• intention 
of tlw partiPs and became part and parcel of the contract 
lwl\l"PPn the parties. As noted by the Illinois Supreme 
Court in Miller v. Gordon, 296 Ill. 346, 129 N.E. 809 
( 19:21), a part>' cannot conq)lain when a contract he him-
;.;Plf pn•parcd is enforced against him. 
l r. REf'LY '1'0 DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT I. B. 
There is No Legal Doctrine of "Subsequent Confirm-
r1tion"' of a Prior Invalid Orn! Agreement, and the 
R1.·idcnce Does Not Si1pport the Finding of an Oral 
Optio11 different from the July 25 agreement. 
DPf Pndants' position, set ont on page 19 of their 
hrief, is nnknmvn at common law. Defendants do not 
claim that at some time after July 25, 1963 the parties 
agreed to modify the writing of that date. They do not 
rlaim that they relied to their detriment upon some new 
oral agreement, or that a novation transpired. (See 
Tr-3, p. 31) Defendants simply state that the prior oral 
a.l('rrement was somehow "confirmed" after July 25 and, 
in somp mysterious fashion, unknown at common law, 
it superseded the intervening written agreements of 
that elate. There is, of course, no authority for the 
proposition that conduct subsequent to a written signed 
liy rill the parties can "confirm" an alleged oral contract 
which huth predates the writing and conflicts with the 
termR of said writing. 
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Begilliling at page 19 of their brief, defendants set 
forth eleven paragraphs purporting to recite evidence 
"conclusively" supporting this novel theory of "sub-
sequent confirmation.'' 
Paragraph 1, in the first place, is not evidence of 
"subsequent confirmation." Secondly, the statement that 
"Larson testified that this was a clear understanding of 
the parties on July 11, and ,July 25, 1963" is in no way 
substantiated by the three references to the trial trans-
cript there cited. All three references merely suggPst 
on July 11 1963, Larson Oil Company and TOSCO pre-
liminarily agreed that the option should commence on 
July 15. 
Defendants' reference in paragraph 2 to Larson's 
employment by TOSCO is no evidence whatsoever that 
both parties confirmed the prior oral agreement subse-
quent to the July 25 agreement. Paragraphs 3, 4, and 
5 refer to drafts of options and leases prepared by 
Tweedy and Dufford at various dates. As noted at page 
27 of plaintiff's brief, dates used in draft documents can-
not be considered evidence as to the commencement date 
of an option period. Moody v. Smith, 9 Utah 2d 139, 340 
P.2d 83 (1959). The Tweedy drafts of July 18 are not 
subsequent to July 25; the dates used by Dufford on De-
cember 13 in no way reflect TOSCO'S position at any 
time; and defendants' thesis leads to the absurd conclu· 
sion that in February of 1964 TOSCO was attempting 
to secure Larson's execution of an agreement which 
TOSCO "clearly understood" had already expired. 
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'!'he letter dated August 3, 1963 from Koolsbergen 
to Larson, reft>rred to in paragraph G (Def. Exhibit 24), 
has no reference whatsoever to any option period. It 
obviously rt>frrs to the July 25 agreement, and in no way 
indicates that TOSCO considered the option period to 
have begun. Similarly, the memoranda of Larson partial-
1)' set forth in paragraph 7 do not refer to any option 
period. They merely indicate that Larson was anxious 
to gd tlw formal documents signed and to receive his 
$20,000 upon such event, as provided by the terms of the 
July 25 agreement. They also indicate that Larson was 
looking forward to .January 15, 1964 as the date of exer-
cise of the option, at which time he would be entitled to 
5000 shares of TOSCO stock. 
'l'lw words on the checks issued by TOSCO, and 
the letter from TOSCO's treasurer (Par. 10) by no stretch 
of the imagination imply anything but a course of action 
on tht· iiart of TOSCO in complete conformity with the 
writt<>n agreement. There is no reference to option period 
dates whatsoever. "Winston's statement of March 23, 
19fi5 (Par. 11) is simply an identifying reference to the 
unsigned draft documents. If this is evidence of TOSCO's 
"clear understanding", there would have been no point 
in di~cussing the "rights and dnties" of the parties under 
an agreE•rnent which "TOSCO understood had expired" 
two months earlier. 
Paragraph S refers to Larson's hearsay account of 
his telPphone conversation with Lenhart on January 14, 
10G4, j11st one day before the alleged expiration date. The 
rPasons for Len hart's ignorance of the mattff are ex-
11 
plained on page 27 of plaintiff's brief. Paragraph 10 re. 
fers to a self ~wrving lettPr written h~- Larson to th,. 
accountants who were auditing TONCO's books in late 
January, 1964. 'l'hus out of 11 paragraphs of so-caUed 
"evidPnce" only two, varagraphs 8 and 9, so much ao 
snggPst a conmwnC('!llPnt dat<> of thP option iwriod dif-
fering from that pro\·idPd in th<· .J 11!~- 25 agrPPlllPnt. BotJ1 
of those paragraphs rl'fer to sPlf-serving statements b>· 
Larson himself attPmping to eonYPY his hPlief that tlir• 
commencement of the option i1eriod differed from the 
time provided in the Jnly 25 agre<"lllent. The first at-
tempt occurred the day before the al!PgPd option iwriod 
was to expire; the othPr occurred sornetiuw af t<·nrnnl. 
No n·iden<'e whatsoever is advanced tPnding to prove 
that prior to January 14, 1964 TOSCO was en'n aware 
of Larson's belief that the option period expired on 
January 15, let alone that TOSCO ever agreed to or 
acquiesced in such belit>f. The <c~Yidence of 'l'OSCO'S 
actions set out in sections B.2. and B.5. of plaintiff's lirid 
clearly proves that TOSCO at all times relied on the clear 
and express provisions of the ,Jn[~- 25, 1963 written agree-
ment. 
III. REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT I.C. 
A. flf'fendants are Precl11ded from Making the 
Arguments Set Forth in Section J.C. of Tl1ci1 
Brief Because Such Arguments are Co11tradic-
tory to Defendants' Position. Below. 
At trial dt>f Pndants urgPd upon tlw court the theory 
that the writtPn agrPement of .July 25 was subsequently 
modified to provide for tlw allegt>d July 15 to January 
12 
1:-i option IH'rformanc~~ dates. The trial court's decision 
to admit parol evidenc<> over plaintiff's objection was 
bas<'d upon that theory. (Tr-3, p. 3G) The defendants 
now abandon their trial theory of subsequent oral modifi-
r-ation, sinee there is no evidence to that effect, and urge 
Pntin·ly different theories upon this court which were 
never presented to the trial court. 
The following excerpts from the transcript of No-
n~mhPr 18, 19G6 reflect the posititon taken by the defend-
;rnts at the time of trial: 
MR. DUFFORD: ... We have no question 
at all, had the lawsuit started ten days after that 
July 25 nwmo, that no Pvidence could have been 
introduced to show that there was an oral term to 
that option, contrary to what the written docn-
lllPnts said .... (Tr-3, p. 31) 
* * * 
MR. DUFFOR.D: Initially, the agreement 
said that they would-'rosco would pa:-.' the $20,-
000.00 whPn the formal agreements were executed. 
'l'h<•n• is no question hut what the parties felt this 
wonld he within a relatinly short period of ti1m•, 
after July 25. (Tr-3, p. 33) 
1'HE COUR'r: What is your answer to that 
elaim that it could not he possible because of the 
:-1tatnte of Frauds, and because of the Parol Evi-
dence Rule. 
MR. ASHTON: And merger of agreements. 
1\fR. DUFFORD: The rebuttal to that, your 
!Ionor, I believe is this. We concede, that an oral 
option is unenforceable unless subsequent acts of 
the parties, rPliance upon the facts that there is 
an nnpnforceable agrePment to begin with, the 
snhs<:>(pwnt actions of thP parties, may be to their 
rletrime11t in such a wa~Y that they can breath life 
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in to an otlwrwise enforceablP (sic) oral contraet. 
That is what happened here. (1-1 r-3, p. :34) (F,rn_ 
phasis snpplied.) 
* * * 
THE COURT: That's trnP if th<> <'vicl<>n<••· 
justifies that conclusion in light of thP law thn 
brought to m:· atenttion. I am ref erring to th~ 
Statute of Frauds and the Parol Evidence Rule. 
MR. DUFFORD: Yes Sir. 
THE COURT: Did the Court error (sic) in 
that respect~ 
MR. DUFFORD: Not in the least so far a' 
we are concerned, :·on did not error (sic). 
The Court didn't error (sic) and then· was 
no variance of a written agreement by parol teo:ti-
mony in this case. Bnt any written contract can 
be amendt-d, modified, changed or altered as much 
as people desire subject (sic) to its execution. 
If those changes are made b:· parol or oral chang!' 
after the exc>cntion of the agreement, and that is 
what lWJJpcned in this case. July 25, they said Wf' 
are going to ... 
1'HE COURT: Do yon claim there was a 
novation? 
MR. DUFFORD: Not a novation, an amend-
ment of the basic contract, some of the terms of 
the basic contract, and a waiver of certain reqnirf'-
ments. (1'r-3, pp. 35, 36) (Emphasis supplied.) 
Defendants argued to the trial court that there 
was ~n oral modification of the writing after the .July 
25, 1963 written agreement had been signed, and that 
defendants had relied, to their detriment, upon this al-
leged snhseqnent oral modification. This was the only 
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way 111 which they could avoid the parol evidence rule, 
llw doetrim' of merger and the statute of frauds. 
Defendants do not advance their theory of subse-
quent oral modification on appeal because there is no 
eYidt>n<'P in the record to support it. Yet that was the 
onl>· theory upon which the trial court conld have based 
its decision since it was the only theory proffered at 
trial. Defendants are therefore precluded from urging 
the four totally new and inconsistent theories presented 
in Argument I.C. for the first time on appeal by the 
established rules of estoppel. One rule is stated in 5 CJS 
.:\ ppeal and Error, §1503: 
The general rule is that a person cannot 
try his case on one theory in the trial court and 
on another theory in a court of review. \Vhether 
the result in the trial court is in his favor or 
against him and this is the rule both in law and 
t>quity .... hence a party is estopped to urge on 
appt>al or t>rror any error growing out of the trial 
submission or decision of the cause or of any 
quPstion therein upon an incorrect theory when 
snch theory was of his own selection or when such 
thPory was adopted by the trial court at his r£>-
quest. 
Wht>n a party relies in the trial court on a 
cPrtain ground or theory of action or defense he 
is honnd thereby and will not be allowed in the 
ap1wllate court to assume or adopt any position 
or attitude which is inconsistent therewith or to 
shift, changP or abandon his theory or cont<>ntions 
nor ·will he be heard to question the propriety or 
the validitv of his coursP in that behalf nor mav 
he enlarge. his theory of recovery. The rule ap-
plit>s to a party who has tried his case wholly or in 
part on a certain theory. 
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This court has ado11t<·d and affirnwd t}w abow ru[(,, 
In Erans v. Shand, 74 "Gtah 451, 280 Pac. 239 (1929) thi 8 
court stated: 
''The appellant in her reply ... asserts that 
the rPspondent is hound by the theory of his all(·-
gations and of the findings and may not now on 
appeal from the judgment founded thereon depart 
therefrom. vVe think the contention is well found-
ed. The rule is well sPttled that on appeal th1· 
parties are restricted to the theor~- on which th" 
case was prosecuted or defendPd in th<' comt 
below." 
See also, Obradovich v. Walker Bros. Bankers, 80 
Utah 587, 16 P.2d 212 (1932), affirming the Evans rule. 
B. Thrre is No Issue as to the Execution Date of 
the Contract. 
There has never been a question as to the date of 
execution of the July 25 agreement. The agreement was 
dated July 25, 1963, and executed July 26, 1963. Defend-
ants attempt to justify the admission of parol evidence 
on the ground that such evidence "in effect" shO\n.; a 
''different'' effective datP. This was not the purpose of 
the introduction of parol evidence at the trial. Moreover, 
the cases cited as supporting their position, General 111-
sttrance Co. v. Henich, 13 Utah 2d 231, 371 P.2d 642 
(1962), and Olsen v. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200 P.2d n3 
(1948), nwrely hold that ·when a c1uestion arisPs as to 
\d1ether the date specified in a contract is the actual 
date the contract \Yas signed, parol eYidence can be intro-
duced to clarif~' that point. The date of execution is not 
in question here, and parol eYidence is not admissihlP to 
Yary the terms of the Jul~- 25 agreement. 
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C. 'J'he July :25 A.qre1'mcnt is a F?tll or Prtrtial In-
tegration. 
lkfendants contend that the July 25 agreement is 
llll'rel~' a ll'tkr of intent, and that parol evidence is ad-
missible to show that the option period ran from July 
lf), 1963 th rough January 15, 1964. They argue that the 
terms specifically agreed upon in the July 25 agreement 
may be varied or contradicted by parol evidence. In citing 
Section 228( a) of the Restatement, Contracts, they ignore 
ot!H·r relevant portions of the Restatement. Section 232, 
!'ntitlt>d "Standard of Interpretation Application to Inte-
gration of Part of an Agreement," states as follows: 
\Yhere part of an agreement has been inte-
grat1•d, the standard of interpretation of that part 
is the same as that applicable to an agreement 
which has been wholly integrated. (Restatement, 
Contracts, ~232 (1932 ed.)) 
Apparmtly, defondants have also forgotten their own 
position at trial. At the hearing on .January 18, 1967, Mr. 
Dufford argned as follows: 
MR. DUFFORD: ... We have no question 
at all, had the lawsuit started ten days after that 
.J nly 25 memo, that no evidence couid have been 
introduced to show that there was an oral term 
to that option, contrary to what the written docu-
ments said. . . . ( Tr-3, p. 31) 
.:\IR. DUFFORD: 'l'hat option agreP11wnt was 
that the Larsons, the defendants, would provide 
'!'OSCO with a six months option to lease the 
mining claims, as consideration for that option; 
tht'~' w<>re to pay the Larsons $20,000.00 and as 
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stated in tlw initial agn-'1•11H,nt, when thl' fol'mal 
documents were signed. But, as l\lr. Larson h•sti 
fied his undPrstanding was that en>rybod~- agTf'(•r! 
that the option period would commence .July 13th. 
So he goes forward on that undPrstanding. J don't 
think again that there is an~- qtwstion that hi0 
interpretation of the documents at the font• ther 
'vere executed was not correct, hut what did th~· 
parties do here. 
THE COURT: His intPrpretation is not tlu· 
decisiw mattt•r. 'Vas there an option agreernent: 
(Tr-3, p. 32) 
Defendants' theory is based upon Larson's admittedly 
erroneous understanding of the meaning and effect of 
the July 25 agreement. The law requires a more ohj~c­
tiw test, as the Restatement indicates: 
ST AND ARD OF INTI~RPRE'l'A'l'IO;\ 
WHERE THERE IS INTEGRATION. 
The standard of interpretation of an intq:rra-
tion, except where it prodtH'PS an ambiguous n·-
sult, or is excluded by a rule of la"' establishing 
a definifr uwaning, is tlw meaning that would lw 
attached to tlw intPgration by a reasonabl~- intPl-
ligPnt person acquainted with all operatiw usages 
and knowing all the circumstances prior to and 
contemporaneous with the making of thP inte~ra­
tion, other than oral statements by the parties of 
"·hat they intended it to mean. (Restatenwnt, 
Contrncts, §230 (1932 ed.)) 
That the July 25 letter is an integration, not a mere 
lPtter of intent, is clear from the definitions supplied by 
the Restatement section only partially quoted by defend-
ants. The discnssion immediatPly preceding the language 
qnotPd by dPfendants states as follows: 
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An agrePlllent is intPgratP<l wlwre the partiPs 
tlwrl'to adopt a writing or \\Titings as the final 
and complete exprPssion of the agrPement. An 
intPgration is tlw writing or writings so adoptPd. 
a. IntPgrated contracts must be distin-
gnislwd frolll written memoranda by which con-
tracts may be provPd, and from contracts form<'d 
l1y letters or other informal writings the words 
ol which hai;e not been assented to by both parties 
as a definite and complete expression of their 
agreement . ... (Restatement, Contracts, ~228(a) 
( 1932 Pd.)) (J~mphasis :mpplied.) 
On .Jnl~' :W, 1963, all parties recordPd their assent 
to the .J ul~v 25 agrPement as a definite and complete ex-
prrssion of tlw undPrstandings they had reached at that 
dak Larson's interpretation of the effect of the July 25 
agreement was, as his counsel admitted at trial, simply 
incorrect. 'rhat interpretation does not justify the admis-
sion of parol \•videncP to vary a term covered by the July 
~5 writing and agrePd npon at that time by all the parties 
who signed it. 
D. Parol Rvidence is Inadmissible to J' ary the Clear 
Terms of the July 25 Agreement. 
In both Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53, 
348 P.2d 337 (1960) and Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 
105 Utah 272, 143 P.2d 281 (1943), the sole authorities 
cited by defendants in their Argument I.C. 3., this court 
rejected the offer of parol evidence on thP gronnd that 
snch evidence cannot be introduced to vary the clear 
tPrms of a writing. In Davis, this court noted that it 
might hP possible to show hy parol evidence that both 
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parties entered into a new contraet altering tlw ternu; of 
an earlier contract. The issue here, hmn'ver, it-> the in-
terprPtation of an original written contract. In Parr, 
both parties relied on oral contracts, and this court fonnd 
that the partiPs did entl:'r into an independent oral agree-
ment on tPrms not covPred b? the original writing. In 
the instant case, any reasonable reading of the July 25 
agreement reveals that the time of the commencement 
of the six month option period is clearly covered therein. 
At page 30 of their brief, under Argument I.C.4., 
defendants reach the illogical conclusion that nnd1•r 
TOSCO's interpretation tlwre was no contractual rt>la-
tionship whatsoever. On July 25, the parties agreed to 
the t0rms expressed in the writing of that dak If tlw 
$20,000.00 had not been paid, of course Larson would 
not be legally bound to execute formal docmnents, a' 
agreed in said writing. The fact of this case is that th~ 
$20,000.00 has been paid, pursuant to that agreement and 
Larson's request. 
IV. REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT I.D. 
Parol Ei:idencc of an All<'ged Oral Contract Contra-
dictory to the July 25 Agreement is Barred l!y t/11' 
Statiite of Frauds. 
Defendants' statement that the statute of frauds has 
no application to an "executed agreement" is wishful 
boot-strapping. TlH' cases cited by defendants, Green-
wood v. Jackson, 102 Utah 161, 128 P.2d 282 (1942), and 
Cutright v. U11io11 Sm:in,r;s & Investment Co., 3:1 etah 
486, 94 Pac. 984 (1908), in no wa~- support their stated 
proposition. Both casPs dealt w;th th0 doctrine of pnrl 
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pirformancc in Utah; both held that parol evidence was 
inadmissible to Pstablish parol gifts, in violation of the 
statlltl' of frauds; and in both the evidence failed to 
t'stahlish sufficient part performance to take the alleged 
oral contract out of the statute of frauds. As stated in 
plaintiff's brief, detn:mental performance on the part of 
tlw party alleging the oral agrerment must be proved in 
order to take any oral modification of a contract for in-
tPn'st in land out of the statute of frauds. 
The written agreement provides that the six month 
option lwriod will commence at some time subsequent to 
.Jul~' 25, 19G:J, after certain conditions precedent are satis-
fied. Defendants claim not only that the six month option 
period began before such conditions were satisfied, but 
also that it began to run 10 days before the written agree-
ment 'rns even signed. One cannot avoid the statute of 
frauds by alleging an "executed" oral contract which is 
inconsist<>nt with a subsequent clear and concise writing 
sig1wd hy all of the parties. 
Y. REPLY TO D:mFENDANTS' ARGUMENT III. 
A. Plaintiff is Alternatively Entitled to a New Trial. 
Def t>ndants attack 'rOSCO's argument for new trial 
\rithont onP citation to appropriate authority. They chal-
lenge the application of Nichols v. Whitacre, 112 Mo. 
App. 692, 87 S.W. 594, by stating that this case "involved 
a jury and the improper instructions was not consistent 
"'ith the evidence.'' Defendants' representation to the 
trial court that there was a subsequent oral modification 
of the contract, upon which they relied, was certainly not 
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consistent with the evidence, as plainly shown in Section 
III, supra, of this Reply Brief. 
Tlw trial conrt stated that it based its judgment 
on a subsequent oral modification which avoided the parol 
evidence rule and the statute of frauds. ( Tr-3, p. :3C) 
On this appeal, defendants claim only that a prior, invalid 
oral agret>ment was somehow suhst~qnently "confirmed.'' 
Yet then• is no e\·idence of subsequent oral modification 
or dc>trinwntal reliance. This in itself entitles plaintiff 
to a nPw trial, to present evidence rebntting such theor-
ies. 
Furthermore, it haH been lwld that when facts haVI' 
been proved but are not found by the court and are therP-
f ore deemed unproved, a new trial should be awarded on 
the ground of snrprise. Lupton v. Taylor, 39 Ind. App. 
412, 78 N.E. GS9 (1906), Gray v. Taylor, 2 Ind. App. 155, 
28 N.I~. 220 (1891). Here plaintiff has proved that 
'l'OSCO relied not npon any eplwmeral "oral understand-
ings" to guide its conduct, but upon the express terms of 
tlw July 25 writing. Such fact was ignored and not fonnd 
by the trial court. This silence is ettnivalent to snrpri8l'. 
and plaintiff is entitled to a new trial in order to intro-
duce further evidence to support its view of tlw effect of 
the July 25 agreement. 
Defendants took totally contradictory positions on 
various issues during the trial. ThP>. even abandoned 
their pleadings and submitted Findings of Fact an<l Con-
clusions of Law which found that thPre never was a con-
tract. The trial court signed these Findings and Conclu-
sions, only later to discover, at plaintiff's insistence, that 
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thi»· did not n'1n·esPnt its ,jnd~mt>nt at all. '!'he confused 
aiirl tortuous path of this casP entitlPs plaintiff to a new 
trial, wherP evid1•ncP ('an be offered by plaintiff to refute 
tlwori1's not in tlw casP at the ontset. 
B. Plaintiff is AlternO!tively Entitled to Restitution. 
In the ewnt the court rnles that the agreement of 
Jnly 25, 1963 is not specifically enforceable, plaintiff 
is entitled to restitution of the $20,000 it paid to defend-
ants in rPliance on said contract. 
'!'his suit was brought for a declaratory judgment 
<lf the rights of the parties under the July 25 agreement. 
At the outset of the trial defendants denied the existence 
of an~- contract between the parties and admitted that if 
tlwir position wPre sustained, they would return the 
$~0,000 to TOSCO. No counterclaim or affirmative de-
f Pnse was pleadPd alleging a different agreement. Not 
until aftt>r tht:> tt:>stirnony of the witnesses, and after the 
eourt reYea!Pd its thPor~' that there was a completed 
eontract, did defendants take the position that there had 
indeed bPt>n a binding contract between the parties, though 
pnrportPdl~- different from the .July 25 agreement. Under 
tlw theorit:>s of the casP governing the conduct of the trial, 
Pither tht:> .Tuly 25 agreement is a specifically enforce-
ahl!' contract undf'r which plaintiff has performed, or it 
is not a s1wcifically Pnforceable contract and plaintiff 
il'l <>ntitll•d to r1'stitntion of the sum it gave defendants 
in reliance on said agreement. 
It may he that both parties took different views of 
the legal relationship established by the July 25 agree-
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ment. This court could find that Larson believed that 
the oral understanding of July 11, 19G3 was not changed 
or affected by the new agreement entered into on Jul)· 
25, 19G3, and sigm~d b~- Larson on July 2G, even though 
said agr<'ement specifically 1irovided that the option 
period would not connnPnce until the claims were distri-
buted, the documents signed and the money paid. Plain-
tiff vigorously contends such position is untenable, and 
that all evidence of any such belief is inadmissible to vary 
the terms of the signed writing. Nevertheless, this court 
might conclude such to be Larson's personal statP of 
mind. 
Such finding can in no way repudiate the uncontra-
dicted testimony of TOSCO's attorney and chief execu-
tive officer, corroborated by 'l'OSCO's actions, that at 
no time subsequent to July 25, 1963, did 'l'OSCO heliere 
or understand that the option period had begun to run. 
Larson's testimony as to what he believes is not evidence 
as to what TOSCO belie\·ed. It was TOSCO's position at 
trial, just as it has been TOSCO's position in all its 
dealings with dt•fendants, that the option period would 
not commence until, as provided by the writing of Jnl)· 
25, the option and lease documents were signed. 
As pointed out in plaintiff's brief, it is basic to con-
tract law that a party acting to its own detriment for the 
benefit of another, under a mistaken belief that there 
was an agreement between the parties, must be restor~d 
to its original position. The following statement from 
Section 15, RestatE'ment, Restitution, reflects such prin-
ciple: 
A person is entitled to recov(•r moue~- ·which lie ha~ 
paid another person nuder tltP h>nns of a snpJJ0' 1'd 
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contract with or offer from tlw other which, lw-
cause of the payor's mistake of fact as to the 
PxistPnce of consPnt or consideration, or of a re-
qnirt>d formality, he erroneously believed to exist, 
if lw does not get the expected exchange. 
Hen· 'l'OSCO paid $20,000 to defendants in the belief that 
they had consented to the writing of July 25 and would 
comply therewith by completing the formality of execut-
ing the necessary documents granting TOSCO a six 
month option. It has not received the expected exchange 
and therefore, if not decreed specific performance, is 
entitled to restitution. 
Defendants speculate that TOSCO chose not to ac-
quire the Larson lands. There is no evidence to support 
snch supposition. The agreement on July 25 was to grant 
in the future to TOSCO a six month option period in 
which to decide whether or not to acquire the Larson 
lands. Defendants' statement that TOSCO "obviously" 
wantt>d to reduce the cost of its acquisition of the Larson 
lands is also unsupported by any evidence. The $20,-
000 was indeed paid "on the strength of Larson's as-
snrance that the defendants would execute some kind 
of document" (Plaintiff's Brief, pp.12, 28); that was the 
basis of the July 25 agreement, as specifically recited 
therein, and the basis for all of 'fOSCO'S acts. 
TOSCO has consistently taken the position that the 
language of the July 25 agreement governed the relation-
ship of the parties. TOSCO is entitled to receive a six 
month option, having paid the $20,000 called for in the 
Jnly 25 agreement. If TOSCO's position was and is er-
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roneons, its payment of $20,000, based on :,;nch position, 
cannot inure to defendants' benefit, whatever Larson's 
personal belief might have been. 
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